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Comment on John Smythies, “The Metaphysical Foundations of Contemporary Neuroscience: A House 
Built on Sand” 
 
In his contribution, Smythies claims that the metaphysical presuppositions that neuroscientists make are 
seriously out of step with what we know about the constitution of the world. He discusses (1) the three-
dimensionalist world-view of neuroscientists which conflicts with the result from the special theory of rela-
tivity that the universe is a four-dimensional space-time worm; (2) the direct realist conception of percep-
tion as direct contact with worldly objects, which is contradicted by what neuroscience itself has shown, viz. 
that the objects of perception are the products of neural processes and thus distinct from the worldly ob-
jects causing these processes; and (3) the identity theory of the mind, which cannot be correct because 
neural states and mental states clearly have different properties. I will here focus on the first two of Smyth-
ies’s points (though I disagree with the third as well.) 
As Smythies states, special relativity treats time as a dimension more or less on a par with the three spatial 
dimensions. He concludes from this, first, that ordinary objects are not three-dimensional, but four-
dimensional, and second, that objects don’t change: They are eternal, immobile things that just have differ-
ent properties at different space-time locations. This comes down to a perdurantist picture of objects, ac-
cording to which they are not wholly present at any one time but have temporal parts, and, moreover, to an 
eternalist view of time, according to which all times are equally real, as opposed to a presentist view, on 
which only the ever-changing ‘now’ really exists. 
The conflict with neuroscience has its source in the fact that it treats the brain as a three-dimensional some-
thing in which change does take place, in which events occur and can be studied by (they believe, them-
selves changing and moving) neuroscientists. What is really going on, according to Smythies, is that there is 
the four-dimensional, unchangeable block universe, including four-dimensional brain space-time worms, 
and additionally another type of time, the “real time t2 in which the Observer moves” and which explains 
why things, including brains, appear to change to human observers. If I understand him correctly, this is a 
distinct, but equally real time and space. At the end of the article, he says that “[w]hat we experience is 
phenomenal space” and suggests that “phenomenal space and physical space are ontologically and geo-
metrically different spaces”. He thinks that this is not a problem for the everyday practice of experimental 
neuroscience, however. 
My interpretation of these claims is that Smythies holds that, in addition to the actual four-dimensional 
world we inhabit, there is a phenomenal world of our own creation, which has only three spatial dimen-
sions and, as a distinct phenomenon, temporal change. So it appears that, while neuroscientists strive to 
learn how the actual physical brains works, their observations are sadly limited to the workings of the phe-
nomenal brain. Smythies doesn’t draw out this conclusion, but it fits with his claim that we can’t point at 
the location of our actual brain: When we try, we instead “point […] to the head that [we] experience. This 
is a mistake – how can the brain be in the experienced head when the experienced head is in the brain?”  
He thereby also rejects direct realism, the claim that we are immediately confronted with worldly objects in 
perception. He instead adheres to the representative theory. According to this view, what we perceive is 
what the brain constructs based on its conclusions, by inference to the best explanation, as to what is pre-
sent in our environment. In support of this view, Smythies points out that color, shape, and movement are 
processed at different speeds, so that we do not see them all at the same time (which is what direct realists 
would have to claim). Further, he holds that since phantom limbs are possible, the body we perceive cannot 
be our physical body, but must be an entity constructed in the brain.  
I take issue with several of Smythies’s claims and arguments. 
1. Space-time and the impossibility of movement and change: Here, Smythies progresses much too fast. For 
one, the mathematical representation of time as a dimension similar to the spatial dimensions in the special 
theory of relativity does not automatically commit us to the picture of the universe as a four-dimensional, 
eternal, unchangeable block. The first is a mathematical model used in theoretical physics, the second a 
philosophical/ metaphysical claim. This is not to deny that the two claims appear to fit together quite nicely. 
Nonetheless, we need an argument why the claim from theoretical physics cannot be made compatible 
with more intuitive views of space, time and ordinary objects. This is especially true seeing as (according to 
Smythies) the block universe view violates many of our apparently indispensable assumptions about the 
world – such as that there is change or that we see ordinary worldly objects directly. 
For another, even if we accept that the universe is an eternal, four-dimensional block, this by itself does not 
exclude the possibility of change or movement or of direct perception of things in the world. We might say 
that an object, e.g. someone’s brain, changes whenever there is a difference between the features it has at 
two different points along the temporal dimension. And an object moves when it is at two different spatial 
locations at two consecutive times. I don’t see what speaks against interpreting change and movement in 
these ways – it seems that this just what change and movement are, according to this view. It is consistent 
with an unproblematic way of conceiving of spatial differences as a kind of change, where we can say for 
instance that the German landscape changes between the North Sea and Bavaria, as it goes from flat to hilly 
to mountainous. If all this is correct, there is no reason to introduce a distinct phenomenal time to account 
for the apparent change and movements of things. 
2. The untenability of direct realism: Even if there is no change or movement because of how space-time is 
constituted, this does not defeat direct realism. As a paradigmatic version of direct realism, take intentional-
ism, the view that perceptual experience, like belief, essentially represents the world as being a certain way. 
(Tye 1995) That is to say, it has a content, which is responsible for its phenomenal character. It is a variety of 
direct realism because it holds that experience immediately presents the subject with her surroundings, not 
mediated by sense-data or the like. This view accounts for illusions and hallucinations by saying that they 
misrepresent the subject’s environment. It could therefore easily allow that our experience of movement 
and temporal change is a grand illusion – experience simply misrepresents the stationary, unchanging 
world. The same goes for our experience of the four-dimensional world as three-dimensional. But this 
doesn’t mean that there is an extra phenomenal space and time. Rather the situation is exactly analogous 
to someone’s mistakenly believing that there are only the three spatial dimensions, which doesn’t entail 
that there is an extra space and time of her belief either. For the naïve realist, what counts is that we are 
related to worldly objects, even if we get some of their properties wrong. For a naïve realist account of illu-
sion, see Brewer (2008). 
Alternatively, an intentionalist could insist that perceptual experience represents physical objects directly, 
though under a three-dimensional aspect or mode of presentation. The idea might be that we only ever 
represent tiny cross-sections of four-dimensional objects in experience, and that we represent the temporal 
dimension merely by representing, consecutively, the given features of objects (and this is just what we mis-
takenly conceive of as change or movement). Again, there is no need to introduce an additional three-
dimensional space that involves genuine temporal change.  
As to the additional problems that Smythies raises for direct realism (processing of visual stimuli and phan-
tom limb), I don’t see how they are threatening at all to the view. Everyone accepts that neural processing 
underlies perception – it is what is needed to establish our direct perception of our surroundings. It doesn’t 
seem relevant that some visible features are processed more quickly than others. For the intentionalist, the 
way to think about this would simply be that not all features of physical objects begin to be visually repre-
sented at the same time. The naïve realist might say that the perceptual relation between the subject and 
the seen object is expanded over time, first including only a relation to the object and its color, but then 
also to its shape and finally its motion. This seems unproblematic, for it happens in other cases as well. For 
instance, when I look at a slowly spinning statue, I at first perceive (visually represent/am related to) only 
the visible features instantiated by its front, but later also to those of its sides or back.  
Phantom limbs don’t pose a special problem for direct realism either. They are typical examples of halluci-
nation, and will be treated by direct realists in the normal way. Intentionalists will treat them as cases of 
misrepresentation, in which an object (the limb) is represented in a place where there is nothing. Naïve real-
ists will say that, as a hallucination, it is a mental state substantially different from the indistinguishable ve-
ridical perception of the limb. (This follows from the fact that, for the naïve realist, a perception of a limb is 
essentially a relation to the limb, whose phenomenal character is partly constituted by the limb and its per-
ceptible features, whereas there is no actual limb to be related to in phantom limb cases. See Martin 
(2009).) Unfortunately our powers of discrimination between our perceptions and some of our hallucina-
tions are very limited, so that subjects of phantom limb experiences mistake them for perceptions of real 
limbs, or so the naïve realist thinks. Surely, there is more to be said about the plausibility or implausibility of 
either direct realist proposal; my point here is merely that the above perceptual phenomena by themselves 
are not very interesting obstacles. The interesting work would begin after acknowledging the intentionalist 
and naïve realist accounts of these phenomena, by showing that they are somehow inadequate. 
3. The defensibility of an extra phenomenal space and time: If Smythies is right that we only experience the 
phenomenal space and time that our brain constructs, there is indeed a practical problem for experimental 
neuroscience. This is not that neuroscientists use three-dimensional terminology to investigate a four-
dimensional world, but rather that the experiments that neuroscientists conduce are aimed at understand-
ing the functioning of the actual physical brain whose processing gives rise to our mental lives. But on 
Smythies’s account, it is not clear how they are in any position at all to learn or even to talk about the brain 
that does this, when their experiments are allegedly limited to merely manipulating the three-dimensional 
world constructed by the brain. This is at the very least a practical problem. For neuroscientists would need 
some additional philosophical principle allowing them to draw conclusions from what they find out by ex-
periments about their mental constructs (the brain in the brain, so to speak) to what is going on in the actu-
al brain. 
But these considerations bring out a more principled problem for Smythies’s representative realism. The 
basic worry goes back to Berkeley (2008, 89/90). He argues that once we accept that all we are ever con-
fronted with are ideas (or brain-made constructs), our knowledge of the physical objects that allegedly pro-
duce them is forfeit. In Berkeley’s argument, the point is that there is no deductive route from ideas to ma-
terial objects, but also no inductive reasoning that would support claims about the make-up of the world 
beyond our experience, starting from our ideas.  
To apply the Berkeleian point to Smythies’s view: How could theorists’ research that, due to what percep-
tion is limited to, takes as its evidence only entities existing in the three-dimensional phenomenal space, 
give us any definite results about the physical, four-dimensional world? Again, we need some principles that 
tell us how to bridge the gap between our phenomenal world and the physical world. These principles 
would need to be justified somehow. In light of this, one might worry how theoretical physicists can estab-
lish anything about the four-dimensional constitution of the physical world in the first place. I assume that 
physicists take themselves to theorize not about constructs created by their own brains, but about the actu-
al physical world. If they’ve never succeeded in doing so in the first place, there might be hope that the 
problem that Smythies points to doesn’t arise at all. So there is no need to introduce a distinction between 
a physical, four-dimensional space and a phenomenal three-dimensional space either. 
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